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and implementation to ensure the future success of RES auctions in Europe. Applying different 
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The Horizon2020 project AURES II aims at ensuring the effective implementation of auctions for renewable energies in the EU Member States (MS). In recent 
years, auction schemes for the allocation of support for renewable electricity 
sources (RES) have been advancing rapidly across Europe. Auctions are considered 
to have brought down support levels and increased planning capability for RES 
deployment and state budgets. In some unfortunate cases, they have, however, 
also resulted in delayed or unrealised projects and increased uncertainty for project 
developers. A variety of auction designs are still being tested and introduced in 
EU MS, as well as foreseen by European legislation. Therefore, there is still a 
need for further assessment and improvement of national auction design and 
implementation to ensure the future success of RES auctions in Europe.
Applying different qualitative and quantitative methods in the various work 
packages (WPs), the AURES II project partners have already drafted and published 
a large number of reports and studies. This article aims at comprehensively 
presenting these results and provide a first overview.
1. WP2 MONITORING OF AUCTION IMPLEMENTATION
Work Package 2 (WP2) deals with empirical aspects and deriving insights from 
RES auctions in Europe and worldwide. More specifically, currently conducted 
as well as planned auction schemes have been evaluated in several case studies 
with lessons learnt and best practices identified.
So far, concluded auctions in the following countries have been analysed: 
Argentina, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and the UK. In addition, one multi-national, 
technology-specific case study on CSP has been conducted. Furthermore, three 
planned auction schemes have been analysed: the Thor offshore wind auction in 
Denmark, Slovakia, and Ukraine. 
The AURES II consortium will shortly publish a synthesis report on the case 
studies, highlighting the lessons learnt and best practice examples. Nevertheless, 
a first version of this synthesis report will be part of this Special Issue.
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Case cooperations, in which the AURES II consortium provides recommendations 
on auction designs, have been successfully ongoing with policymakers in four 
MS that have ongoing auction implementation processes. These are Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, and Hungary.
2. WP3 AUCTION DATABASE AND EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS
The work carried out in WP3 contains the development of a comprehensive 
database on past and ongoing auction rounds in the EU, including their design, 
timing, and results. Based on these data, two empirical papers are currently being 
drafted. In addition, WP3 comprises several policy briefs that analyse current 
and emerging topics in the realm of renewable energy auctions.
Although a rising number of countries in and outside the EU have implemented 
auctions to support RES, no single, publicly available database exists which 
comprises information on the concluded auctions. Therefore, the AURES II 
consortium closed this gap by collecting and updating the available data on RES 
auctions in the EU (http://aures2project.eu/auction-database/)1. The result is a 
database that covers more than 400 distinct RES auction in 20 EU Member 
States from the years 2011-2021 and which is being updated every six months. 
The database includes information regarding implemented design elements, 
such as prequalification criteria, pricing rules, auctioned volume, the auction 
outcomes (e.g. awarded prices and volumes, level of competition, etc.), as well as 
the realisation rates of the awarded projects, among other elements. 
Based on the data gathered in the AURES II auction database, two empirical 
studies are being drafted and soon to be published: the first one evaluates the EU 
Member States’ RES policy objectives and the implemented RES auction designs 
and the second one examines the efficiency and effectivities of European RES 
auctions quantitatively.
In the first forthcoming paper, Hanke and Anatolitis (forthcoming) collected the 
stated RES policy objectives of EU member states that have an auction scheme 
1 Currently, the database can be downloaded as an Excel- file from the AURES II website: http://
aures2project.eu/auction-database/. An interactive version of the database is currently being developed.
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in place. In a first step, they summarised the objectives (i.e. effectiveness, cost 
efficiency, support cost efficiency, green growth, security of supply, and actor 
diversity) and identified the relationship between these objectives theoretically. 
Based on these relations, they were able to assess whether countries followed a 
consistent strategy when drafting their RES policy objectives. The results indicate 
that 7 out of the 13 analysed countries had well-aligned objectives, three followed 
an ambiguous strategy, and only two showed non-aligned policy objectives. One 
country followed a “neutral” strategy, stating only one objective. In the next step, 
the authors examined whether the countries in focus designed their RES auctions 
according to their objectives. Based on insights from auction theory and on each 
country’s chosen auction design elements retrieved from the AURES II auction 
database, the authors concluded that 10 out of the 13 countries actually showed a 
suitable auction design. In contrast, three countries could improve their schemes 
by adapting their auction designs to their stated objectives.
In the second forthcoming paper, Anatolitis, Azanbayev and Hanke (forthcoming) 
use the data of the auction database to conduct an econometric analysis to 
quantitatively identify the impact of various RES design elements on awarded 
prices in RES auctions. Using a panel data regression model, they were able 
to show that prices dropped significantly over the years. Furthermore, besides 
observing the significant impact of financing conditions and RES share in a 
country, they identified a list of auction design elements with a significant effect 
on the awarded prices: project size, financial prequalifications, realisation periods, 
auctioned technology, competition, penalties, flexibility, multi-criteria auctions, 
quotas, and the remuneration scheme. These findings can support policymakers in 
designing efficient auction schemes. Nevertheless, some of the results contradict 
the predictions of auction theory, such as financial prequalifications or penalties 
decreasing the awarded prices, and should be further researched. 
To date, three policy briefs have been published by the AURES II consortium, 
which provide timely analyses on selected auctions to keep stakeholders up to 
date on new developments: 
Impact of COVID-19 on Renewable Energy Auctions: In May 2020, in the first 
AURES II policy brief, Wigand et al. (2020) analysed the impact of the (starting) 
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COVID-19 pandemic on RES auctions and derived recommendations for 
policymakers on how to deal with these challenges. Four major impact areas have 
been identified: 1) the Covid-19 pandemic leads to decreased energy demand, 
which results in potentially lower short-term demand for RES and potentially 
more EU Member States meeting their 2020 RES targets without additional 
policy action. 2) Disruptions in global supply chains and national permitting 
procedures might endanger project realization and increase accrued penalties. 
Several EU Member States had already prolonged realization deadlines while 
others have postponed or cancelled auctions. 3) Higher RES financing risks were 
observed due to an increased country and policy risk. 4) Falling wholesale market 
prices posed significant challenges for projects without market premiums with 
sufficient floor prices (e.g. merchant plants and plants with a low fixed premium).
Besides advocating that climate-friendly economic stimuli packages should 
increase public clean energy spending and access to finance, the authors 
recommended that policymakers should extend the realisation deadlines of 
awarded projects and in upcoming auctions. Furthermore, policymakers should 
allow for longer award periods and should increase the digitalisation of auction 
procedures. Lastly, the adjustment of auction schedules could be considered, but 
policymakers should avoid downward auction volume revisions.
How (not) to respond to low competition in renewable energy auctions: In this 
second policy brief, Hanke and Tiedemann (2020) analysed possible ways on 
how to deal with a lack of competition in RES auctions that leads to higher 
awarded prices and argued against the use of endogenous rationing. They argue 
that if the reason for the supply shortage is based on the auction design itself 
(strong disadvantages for one bidder group), then it is a good idea to change the 
auction design, including possible interventions for the disadvantaged bidders, 
to achieve a more favourable outcome. If the technology itself cannot generate 
enough supply, multi-technology or cross-border auctions can be helpful to fill 
the volume with supply from other technologies or countries without supply 
shortages. Another option is to reduce the auction volume temporarily and to 
add the missing volumes to future auctions when the supply side has recovered. 
Nevertheless, the authors argue that in no case the reduced auction volume or the 
ceiling price should be determined endogenously within the auction, but only 
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administratively prior to the auction. While short-term improvements may be 
possible with endogenous rationing, long-term effects such as missing renewable 
energy targets prevail. Endogenous rationing not only decreases social welfare 
and increases costs but also damages the market in the long term by further 
weakening the supply side and generating unwanted market distortions. This has 
been proven theoretically, experimentally, and with real-world examples.
The 2020 Nobel Prize for Economics and its connection to AURES II: In this third 
policy brief, Ehrhart, Ott and Hanke (2020) presented the work of Robert Wilson 
and Paul Milgrom, the 2020 laureates of the Nobel Prize for Economics. Robert 
Wilson extended the assumption of private values in auctions, i.e. that each bidder 
only knows the good’s value to them and that different bidders have different 
values, by introducing common values. In a situation with a common value, the 
good has the same value for every bidder, but no bidder knows this value exactly. 
The value may depend on future developments, e.g. market prices, which 
are the same for all bidders but unknown at the time of the auction. An auction 
of this good may lead to the so-called “winner’s curse”: even if the bidders 
estimate the common value correctly on average, the bidder who misjudged the 
value the most will win and will most likely realise a loss. Paul Milgrom, Wilson’s 
former PhD student, analysed a more general model that incorporates the two 
extreme cases of common and private values and provided insights into how 
more information in the auction process help reduce the winner’s curse. In both 
AURES and AURES II, the consortium further investigated the findings of the 
two laureates both theoretically and experimentally to help reduce the risk of 
the winner’s curse and to improve the design of auctions for RES.
3. WP4 EFFECTS OF AUCTIONS ON THE RES SECTOR
WP4 focuses on three aspects of the effects of auctions and auction design on 
the RES sector, i.e. including impacts on supply chains (focusing on market 
concentration in this sector), actor diversity (the impact on energy communities) 
and technological innovation.
It is often argued that a key feature of auctions is the competitive pressure created 
on the overall value chain, and indeed on all actors of the RES sector. Moreover, 
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it is often argued that auctions can induce a reduction in the level of actor 
diversity (AD) in some segments of the value chain, and especially in the project 
development sector. Auctions may favour certain types of actors over others, and 
this may lead to increased levels of market concentration (MC)2. 
Del Río et al. (2020) empirically analysed: 1) the impacts of different auction 
design elements (DE) on MC in the project development and component 
manufacturing segments of the RES value chain; 2) The relative impact of auctions 
(as compared to other (contextual) factors influencing the value chain) on MC in 
those two segments. Country and technology case studies were undertaken based 
on an expert-elicitation protocol (structured interviews with key experts) in four 
countries (Spain, U.K., Peru and South Africa). 
Certain design elements stand out as having a consistently strong positive 
(increasing) or negative (decreasing) impact on the number and diversity of 
project developers and component manufacturers; impacts that are observed in 
all four countries of analysis. The use of transparent publicly-disclosed auction 
schedules, as well as conducting auctions with high frequency, are clearly 
considered to be elements that increase both the number and diversity of actors 
in project developer and component manufacturer value chain segments. The 
opposite is true for all kinds of prequalification requirements. Specifically, when 
prequalification requirements –whether financial, technical or related to bidder 
experience– are stringent (as opposed to lax), they tend to reduce both the number 
and diversity of actors in project developer and component manufacturer value 
chain segments.
In general terms, interviewed experts held a range of diverging views as to whether 
auctions, auction design elements, or context conditions, are most important 
in terms of shaping the number and diversity of actors in the two value chain 
segments of interest. Context conditions and related factors were found to affect 
the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers in 
an overall neutral or positive way. However, in some countries auctions themselves 
2 MC is defined as the distribution of a given market among the participating companies. MC 
reflects both the number of firms within the market/sector (and/or participating in the auction) and 
the diversity of those firms (i.e. the degree of heterogeneity with respect to the size of those firms).
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were not regarded as the major determinant of MC in the two considered stages 
of the value chain. 
Amazo et al. (2020) aim to provide an overview of the impact of auctions 
on renewable energy communities (RECs) and assess measures to support 
these market actors in or outside auctions. According to article 12 (16) of the 
Renewable Energy Directive (REDII), a RECs is “a legal entity: (a) which, in 
accordance with the applicable national law, is based on open and voluntary 
participation, is autonomous, and is effectively controlled by shareholders or 
members that are located in the proximity of the renewable energy projects 
that are owned and developed by that legal entity; (b) the shareholders or 
members of which are natural persons, SMEs or local authorities, including 
municipalities; (c) the primary purpose of which is to provide environmental, 
economic or social community benefits for its shareholders or members 
or for the local areas where it operates, rather than financial profits”. The 
REDII acknowledges the importance of RECs and requires Member States 
to consider the specificities of these market actors when designing support 
schemes. 
RECs can foster the local acceptance and ownership of renewable energy 
development. As indicated by Amazo et al. (2020, p. 26), “RECs can support 
renewable energy development in various ways, for example by increasing 
local participation in planning and decision-making processes, as well as local 
benefits through project ownership. Furthermore, local engagement processes 
of RECs can facilitate the land acquisition process and thus ease the often-
challenging pre-development of sites, particularly for new wind projects”. 
Despite their importance, RECs face special challenges in auctions compared 
to administratively-set remuneration schemes, which is related to their limited 
project portfolio and size. “Participating and winning in an auction requires 
significant expertise and access to capital, which smaller actors do not have to 
the same degree as large, experienced renewable energy developers” (Amazo et 
al., 2020, p. 26).
From their analysis, Amazo et al. (2020) broadly conclude that there is no easy 
solution to promote RECs in the context of auctions. Most importantly, the 
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authors find out that measures to address the impact of auctions on RECs can be 
taken either inside the auction (as in Germany or France) or outside the auction 
(as in Denmark). Measures within the auction include lower pre-qualification 
requirements, longer realization periods, citizen participation bonus and a 
different pricing rule (e.g. uniform pricing instead of pay-as-bid, PAB). However, 
while promoting RECs, these measures inside the auction rules may lead to 
distortions in the auction (Amazo et al., 2020, p. 27). 
In contrast, measures outside the auction, such as exempting RECs from the 
auction and a guarantee fund, can help address financing risk and the allocation 
risk and “interfere considerably less with the auction compared to preferential 
treatment or the exemption from auctions. Denmark’s experience shows the 
uptake of this measure depends on the sufficiency of the guaranteed volume, 
and the limits of a measure’s effectiveness in reversing a trend towards actor 
consolidation” (Amazo et al., 2020, p. 27).
Another topic addressed in WP4 is the impact of auctions on technological 
innovation. Innovation in general and, more specifically, innovation in renewable 
energy technologies (RETs) will be a critical component of the energy transition 
(IEA, 2020). Del Río and Kiefer (2021) analyse the impact of auctions on 
technological innovation in RETs. Deployment policies, such as auctions, will 
not only have impacts on deployment itself (e.g., on diffusion) but on previous 
stages of the innovation process as well (e.g., invention and innovation). However, 
attention has not been paid so far in the auction literature to how auctions and 
auction design elements influence innovation in RETs. Del Río and Kiefer (2021) 
cover this gap by providing a first contribution on this issue and exploring the 
impacts of auctions and auction design elements on technological innovation. An 
analytical framework on the mechanisms linking diffusion-driven technological 
innovation and auctions and their design elements, which merges the insights 
from different approaches, is provided and a preliminary empirical analysis to 
identify the perception of key stakeholders on the topic is carried out. Based on 
theory and on those perceptions, the authors put forward some research proposals 
to be investigated in future research. 
The authors follow an exploratory analysis based on a literature review and an 
exchange of views on the main aspects (actors, variables, relationships between 
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variables and causal links) with different relevant stakeholders knowledgeable of 
both innovation processes in RETs and auctions (and their design elements). The 
authors put forward the following research proposals, to be further investigated 
in the future: 
 ■  The design of the auction (different design elements) may affect innovation 
through several key channels: impact on private R&D through a greater profit 
margin and the expectation that there will be a market for the technology (i.e., 
where manufacturers and technology developers can sell their technology), 
impact on technology diffusion (learning effects) and impact on the competitive 
pressures faced by manufacturers and technology developers to reduce costs or 
increase revenues. 
 ■ The negative effects on innovation from lower profit margins in auctions and 
lower levels of market creation for RETs compared to administratively-set 
FITs may offset the positive effects on innovation from greater competition 
in auctions. Whether this is so for all RETs and auctions depends on the 
technologies, the design of the auction and the details of the administratively-
set remuneration to which the comparison is made. 
 ■ Auctions will be one of the factors influencing innovation in RETs, but probably 
not the main one. Many other policy (e.g., technology-push policies) and non-
policy factors (e.g., the pressure to reduce costs as a result of international 
competition in a globalised sector) influence innovation, and probably to a 
larger extent. 
4. WP5 IMPACTS OF AUCTIONS ON COST OF CAPITAL
The aim of WP5 is to evaluate the effects of auctions and auction design on RES 
project financing, i.e., the cost of capital of RES projects and to suggest auction 
designs that are compatible with the usual financing practices of RES projects. 
The final goal is to provide policy recommendations in terms of design element 
choices that reduce the risks and improve the financing conditions.
This is a crucial issue, since the costs of capital are one of the most significant cost 
factors of RES projects, due to their typically very high capital intensity. However, 
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this issue remains to date under-researched. Indeed, the reduction in different auction 
design elements (DE) of wind and solar PV in the last decades can partly be attributed 
to reductions in financing costs (Egli, Steffen and Schmidt, 2018).
Đukan et al. (2019) map out the potential effects that auctions might have 
on financing conditions of RES projects, focusing on the market effects of 
introducing auction schemes and the effects on financing of individual design 
elements. Therefore, its main purpose is to identify possible causal relationships 
between auctions and their impact on financing conditions for renewable energy 
projects. 
The authors systematically explore possible impacts of different drivers (exogenous 
and endogenous) on financing conditions for investments in new RE assets. 
The drivers are endogenous (renewable energy policy and auction design) and 
exogenous (such as economy-wide effects, monetary policy and the structure 
of the capital market, among others). Three main dimensions of (direct and 
indirect) impact are considered: financing type (project financing vs. balance 
sheet financing), project phase (the project development lifecycle) and actor type. 
Financing conditions are defined as “both the ability to source financing for an 
investment and the cost of sourcing it” (Đukan et al., 2019, p. 10). The authors 
analyse “effects via indicators related to ‘cost of capital’ on the one hand, and 
indicators related to ‘loan conditions’ on the other. We thus differentiate seven 
different impact indicators: weighted average cost of capital (WACC), cost of 
equity, cost of debt, debt-to-equity ratio, hurdle rate, debt service coverage ratio 
(DSCR) requirements and loan maturity” (Đukan et al., 2019, p. 10).
The work relies mainly on qualitative research methods and the methodology 
is based on three steps: 1) a literature review of auction design and financial 
theory literature; 2) semi-structured interviews with seven industry professionals, 
with a background in financing renewable energy investments and/or project 
development; and 3) a validation workshop with industry stakeholders at 
the Wind Europe conference in Bilbao in April 2019 (Đukan et al., 2019). The 
authors warn that their findings should be considered as hypotheses that need 
further research and validation rather than conclusions.
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The results from this report can be summarized in five main categories:
1) Cost of equity and hurdle rates experience both downward and upward pressure from 
auctions. Growth limitations and competitive pressure induced by auctions 
may force project owners to accept lower profit margins, i.e. lead to a reduction 
in hurdle rates. On the other hand, the new risks faced by these owners in the 
auction may lead to higher risk premiums. In addition, “auctions may also 
lead to a decrease in support payments to individual projects, making them 
more dependent on volatile market revenues, potentially causing an increase 
in cost of equity” (Đukan et al., 2019, p. 6). The impact on different types 
of actors can be expected to be different. In particular, small actors would 
probably be more negatively affected, leading to a reduction of actor diversity. 
The impact of some design elements is discussed. Some could be expected to 
affect the risks, the cost of financing a project and the willingness or capability 
to finance it. 
2) Debt financing is most likely impacted more by the remuneration scheme than 
by other auction designs. The authors expect the support design in auctions 
to lead (under certain circumstances) to more difficult and expensive project 
financing3. They find that “two-sided Contract for Difference (CfD) schemes 
(which provide a fixed remuneration independent of the market price) have 
the most positive impact on loan financing conditions since they provide the 
most predictable revenues” (Đukan et al. 2019, p. 6). 
3) Auctions may change the investor landscape, through their diverging effects on 
actors, influencing actor diversity. One of the main findings of this report is 
that auction schemes affect the investor landscape by creating new market 
conditions. Interestingly, the new market conditions have an impact on actor 
diversity, because “Unlike larger actors (such as utilities) that have diverse cash 
flows and easier access to capital, smaller project developers do not necessarily 
have the resources to diversify, and the risks they are exposed to could lead to 
greater financial distress” (op. cit., p. 49). 
3 In addition, “the higher competitive pressure of auctions might also be reflected in the banking 
business, and potentially lead to a small decrease in debt margins” (Đukan et al., 2019, p. 48).
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4) Auctions are a policy tool that, depending on its specific implementation, can be 
a barrier to RE financing, but also provide market stability. On the one hand, 
auctions can improve the stability of support schemes which could be positive 
for financing, both on the equity and debt side. Some design elements would 
be highly positive in this regard, including fixed auction volumes, long-term 
schedules (with well-defined rounds in terms of frequency) and contractual 
commitments between auction winners and a governmental institution. 
5) The impact on financing depends on individual designs and market circumstances. The 
authors stress that the impact on financing depends on individual designs 
and market circumstances. Regarding the former, CfD would have a positive 
effect on the cost of capital, but stringent bid bonds, unrealistic project 
realisation deadlines, unclear auction volumes, low auction round frequency, 
among others, could have a negative effect. Regarding the latter, other factors 
beyond auction design may have a greater influence on the costs of capital and 
financing, including country risks, monetary policy or regulatory barriers.
Đukan and Kitzing (2021) investigate the effects of the shift to auctioning on 
the costs of capital and financing conditions for onshore and offshore wind. They 
use the results from Đukan et al. (2019) as a first step and then proceed with the 
analysis by including more interviewees and focus groups with experts involved in 
financing wind energy projects in Europe to verify the analysed potential effects. 
The authors find that auctions create a competitive environment that pressures the 
industry into accepting higher risks and lower returns. Banks have reduced 
debt margins, while large investors decreased hurdle rates and equity returns, 
despite additional risks from auctions, such as uncertainty about future award 
prices, allocation and qualification risks. The risk of being awarded support and 
incurring sunk costs makes smaller bidders averse to participating in auctions. 
Despite increased price risk, project financing conditions have improved: the 
competitive pressure driven by project sponsors seems to lower financing costs 
and hurdle rates and reduce the cost of capital for offshore projects. 
Roth et al. (2021) provide qualitative and quantitative insights intended to 
contribute to a better understanding of renewable energy financing in the 
European Union both in auction and non-auction environments. The results 
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of the interviews conducted by the authors between December 2019 and April 
2020 show that there is still a considerable gap between EU Member States 
regarding their WACC values for wind and PV projects4. However, most EU 
countries reduced their WACC dramatically since 2014, as well as their Costs of 
Debt and Costs of Equity. The analyses show that multiple reasons are behind 
the observed reduction in the WACC apart from lower interest rates, technology 
improvements, and lower country risks: “1) capital is not only raised from EU 
sources, but it is also flowing from international sources, which could generate 
spillover effects in EU countries where the costs of capital are higher than 
the costs of international investments; 2) the non-standard monetary policy of the 
European Central Bank after the 2008 crisis has resulted in abundant capital 
which triggered lower loan fees and increased competition for business cases; 
3) new market players, such as energy-intensive companies, are under political 
and regulatory pressure to green their portfolios and are consequently shifting to 
different auction design elements (DE) through, for example, corporate PPAs, 
which could add more competitive pressure on the market” (Roth et al., 2021, p. 
5). The results of an econometric analysis performed by the authors confirm the 
findings of the interviews: the main driver of the WACC is the country risk, but 
experiences with renewables are also significant. The introduction of auctions did 
not increase the WACC, rather the opposite was true: increasing experiences in 
auctions different auction design elements (DE) to have a dampening effect on 
the WACC. An interesting finding is that remuneration schemes that reduce the 
exposure to market risks tend to have a decreasing effect on the WACC.
To estimate the effects of different financing conditions on support costs, the 
authors develop a cash flow model that calculates minimum bid levels and debt 
shares, given several optimisation constraints. Based on this, they find that 
Member States should mainly focus on de-risking debt financing, as this would 
deliver the largest support costs savings and WACC reduction. The authors argue 
that, instead of additionally/marginally decreasing cost of debt, de-risking policies 
should also aim at increasing loan maturities and debt size. Such debt de-risking 
could be best achieved by adopting remuneration schemes that decrease the 
4 A data note describing the accumulated data on the cost of capital is currently being drafted and 
will be published soon.
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volatility of the projects cash flows, such as CfD. Furthermore, they also find that 
de-risking the cost of equity –through relaxing pre-qualification requirements, 
reducing bid bonds, prolonging realisation rates etc.– would not yield very large 
additional benefits in terms of support cost reduction. Therefore, policymakers 
should de-risk auction designs in the pre-bidding stage –decrease bid bond levels, 
relax pre-qualification requirements etc.– only if they have policy goals other 
than cost-efficiency, such as increasing actor diversity (Roth et al., 2021, p. 5). 
5. WP6 INTERNATIONAL AUCTIONS
In contrast to national auctions, international auctions are auctions in which 
projects from more than one country can participate, i.e., projects located 
outside of the auction-conducting country can participate and compete for 
support (Ehrhart et al., 2019). There are several good economic reasons for the 
implementation of cross-border auctions, including better use of natural resource 
potentials in Europe, higher market values5, lower cost of capital and higher 
competition (von Blücher et al., 2019). 
These auctions have not been used by Member States, except for the PV auctions 
between Germany and Denmark in 2016, although the picture might change 
in the future, given several EU energy policy developments: the new 2030 RES 
governance, voluntary opening of national support schemes under the REDII, 
the new “Financing Mechanism” and renewables Projects of Common Interest 
(von Blücher et al., 2019, p. 5). 
Cross-border auctions are still perceived to be complex to design and burdensome 
to implement. The aim of WP6 is to define and analyse design questions specific to 
cross-border auctions from a theoretical and an empirical perspective and to 
provide concrete design recommendations to policymakers. 
Von Blücher et al. (2019) assess various design options for cross-border auctions 
and provide practical guidance for Member States seeking to implement them. 
5 Higher market values compared to the values of domestic RES power plants can lead to a 
significant decrease in support payments.
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This report identifies three basic models of cross-border auctions which 
go from a low to a higher intensity of cooperation: Countries may choose 
to conduct unilateral, mutual cross-border auctions or joint auctions (see 
Table 1). The authors observe a trade-off between the transaction costs of 
preparing the cross-border auction (lowest under unilateral cross-border 
auctions, which are the simplest) and economies of scale (highest under 
multilateral auctions).
Von Blücher et al. (2019) also find that the support scheme design must 
be the same for all participants of a cross-border RES auction to allow 
for comparison of bids and thus effective bid selection. However, the 
conditions under which project developers can realise RES projects differ 
between countries due to the national specific regulatory and market 
conditions. These aspects cannot easily be aligned in the context of a cross-
border auction, as they reflect a broader regulatory and political context. 
The authors propose three key options to level regulatory differences: 
1) Adjusting bids by the cost impact of the regulatory framework; 
2) Implementing quotas to limit the distributional effects of these 
differences, and; 3) Aligning the regulatory framework. They recommend 
refraining from levelling differences artificially in order to tap into the 
full efficiency potential of the auction. However, if differences need to 
be addressed, they recommend to consider quotas as they are the most 
straightforward solution to the challenge (i.e., option number 2 above).
Table 1
Basic models of cross-border auctions
 Models Explanation
Unilateral auction Both countries conduct auctions but only one country opens its support 
scheme to foreign projects
Mutual opening Both countries open their auction schemes, either sequentially or in 
parallel
Joint auction Two countries implement a common auction scheme, open to projects 
from both countries
Sources: von Blücher et al. (2019), Ehrhart et al. (2019).
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The authors propose 8 good practices of cross-border auction design6 and 
highlight and discuss other challenges in cross-border auctions7.
A more formal (theoretical) analysis of the (support costs and allocative) 
efficiency of different types of cross-border auctions is performed in Ehrhart et al. 
(2019), which refer to different intensities of cooperation as in von Blücher et 
al. (2019). In addition to Separate auctions, the aforementioned three types of 
cross-border auctions are considered: Unilateral Auctions, Mutual Auctions and 
Joint Auctions. The authors perform auction-theoretic modelling. They conclude 
that Joint Auctions can achieve both allocative efficiency and moderate award 
prices (support cost efficiency). However, a complex implementation process 
and necessary bi-lateral coordination might make this option difficult to realise. 
Implementing this type of auction is quite complicated due to a high degree of 
cross border integration and regulatory coordination (Ehrhart et al., 2019, p. 30). 
Sequential Mutual Auctions, i.e., when the open auctions are conducted one 
after another and with enough time in between the auctions and not within a 
very short time frame, lead to similar outcomes, but with less administrative 
effort, since both participating countries can choose their own auction design. 
The remaining design choices all show a low probability of allocative efficiency 
and might lead to higher awarded prices. More generally, the analysis shows that 
parallel auctions (where project developers must choose in which auction they 
want to participate and cannot participate in both) tend to decrease the efficiency 
of a support scheme. Based on their theoretical analysis, the authors recommend 
Sequential Mutual Auctions when designing cross-border auctions since they 
combine “the benefits of relatively straightforward implementation with the 
allocative efficiency of a Joint Auction” (Ehrhart et al., 2019, p. 35).
6 These good practices include: 1. Bids need to be comparable. 2. Adapt design to cross-border 
context. 3. Check cross-border applicability of all design elements. 4. Keep it simple. 5. Take care 
to not exacerbate differing conditions of participation for bidders. 6. Ensure RES deployment while 
limiting transaction costs. 7. Give sufficient consultation and bid preparation time. 8. Reduce the 
administrative complexity.
7 These other challenges include: the interactions of cross-border with national auctions 
(recommending that the auction schedules should be synchronised with a view to provide a 
continuous pipeline and avoid boom and bust cycles in the RES industry), the design of a suitable 
premium, the allocation of the costs and benefits, the practical implementation of cross-border 
auctions and the disbursement of funding and data transfer.
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In turn, von Blücher et al. (2020) show the basic functioning of one pooled 
cooperation mechanism which is effectively a cross-border auction, the EU RES 
financing mechanism (ERFM). This is an instrument to support and ensure the 
cost-effective target achievement at the EU level, as provided in Article 33 of 
the Governance Regulation. Under the ERFM, Member States may choose to 
make voluntary financial contributions to the mechanism (contributing Member 
States). The mechanism subsequently implements a RES auction which determines 
support levels and allocates grants to RES projects in hosting Member States, 
which also choose to participate voluntarily. The hosting Member States transfer 
the RES target statistics from these RES installations back to the mechanism, 
which then redistributes the RES statistics to the contributing Member States 
according to their share of financial contributions. 
The report shows that the ERFM provides an effective tool to aggregate RES 
cooperation among Member States, thereby increasing the cost-effectiveness 
of RES support. The ERFM can be tailored to Member State preferences, as 
they define whether they want to participate and under which conditions. Some 
recommendations are provided: retaining parts of the RES statistics for hosting 
Member States (e.g. 80/20) in order to increase their acceptance, providing 
support in the form of upfront investment aid and adopting multi-item, static, 
pay-as-bid auctions in which the auctioned good is capacity, with required 
financial pre-qualification / bid bonds and sufficient realization periods to cover 
country differences in project development lead times. 
Bartek-Lesi et al. (2020) give an overview of the most important factors 
influencing the set-up of a cross-border auction between Hungary and possible 
partner countries using the Green-X model to assess the likely impacts. The results 
show that Hungary would be the host country in cooperation with Austria and the 
contributing country with Romania, while cooperation with Slovakia would 
lead to only small changes in RES-E deployment. Slovakia was chosen as the 
hypothetical partner country for this case study. The case study compared the tender 
design of the two countries to provide recommendations on how to harmonize 
to a cross-border relationship regarding the size of plants eligible for support, 
the prequalification requirements used in the opened auction, the dilemma on the 
type of feed-in premium (FIP) to be used and on setting the market reference 
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price for the winners in the host country, the setting of the length of the project 
realization periods and the setting of penalties. The Green-X modelling results 
suggested that the cooperation with Romania could bring the highest benefits 
for Hungary which can be evenly distributed to make the relationship mutually 
beneficial. However, it is not yet clear when and how Romania will shift to an 
auction scheme. Another option for Hungary is to consider participation in the 
EU’s renewable energy financing mechanism. 
Kerres et al. (2020) examine how the Contracting Parties (CPs) of the Energy 
Community can participate and benefit from cross-border renewable energy 
cooperation. It focuses on cross-border auctions and joint projects as the key 
instruments for the CPs to cooperate with each other and with EU Member States. 
The policy brief reviews the benefits, rationales and necessary considerations for 
cross-border cooperation, i.e. both from the perspective of the hosting and the 
contributing party. The report introduced each instrument and pointed out 
the associated benefits and risks. The policy brief concludes that cross-border 
cooperation with and amongst the CPs is possible. The regulatory framework 
includes various instruments, each characterized by certain benefits and risks. 
The authors argue that, subject to the design of the legal framework, a variety of 
instruments for cooperation between EU Member States and the CPs could be 
available, assigned to two tracks of cooperation: Cooperation via joint projects 
(possibly supported by funding from the Connecting Europe Facility) and 
national cross-border auctions and cross-border auctions via the EU financing 
mechanism. Cross-border auctions were examined in detail. In this context, a 
key issue meriting further attention is the CPs’ varying stages of liquid day-ahead 
wholesale market development and implementation of market-based support 
schemes. This report suggests two main (transitional) solutions until all CPs have 
implemented liquid day-ahead wholesale markets on which to base premium 
calculation: the use of fixed premiums or the use of sliding premiums with proxy 
reference market prices. Different regulatory frameworks require adaptation 
of support scheme design: 1) if the hosting party has a wholesale market, then 
any support scheme design is feasible; 2) if the hosting party does not have a 
wholesale market yet, intermediary solutions are necessary until all Contracting 
Parties have wholesale markets.
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6. WP7 THE FUTURE OF AUCTIONS
The framework conditions for renewables support continue to evolve. Thus, 
WP7 covers the implications of combining several RES technologies in one 
auction applying theoretical and empirical approaches, and more specifically, 
contributing to the discussion on technology-specific versus technology-neutral 
support. In addition, both the generation costs of renewables as well as the market 
environment in which they operate are likely to change until 2030. Thus, the 
WP furthermore explores the future role and design of auctions under changing 
electricity systems.
In a forthcoming paper, Hanke (forthcoming) conducted several rounds of 
experiments to examine whether it is advisable to conduct auctions with more 
than one technology. She shows that it is indeed favourable for an auctioneer 
(concerning prices as well as efficiency considerations) to include different 
technologies in one joint auction instead of conducting different auctions for 
different technologies. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that technologies 
should be able to compete at least on a basic level and that possible side effects, 
such as the elimination of one technology from the market, might occur. Further, 
the recommendation is to conduct pay-as-bid auctions, as these tend to generate 
lower prices combined with a lower risk of bankruptcy for bidders estimating 
their costs too low while still generating a comparable level of efficiency as 
uniform pricing. 
In their report, Woodman and Fitch-Roy (2020) have developed four qualitative 
scenarios on the future energy systems and have examined the role auctions will 
play in those. The scenarios, which are characterised by the level of flexibility 
and decentralisation of the energy system, show that the status quo model of 
RES auctions is unlikely to be the dominant route to market by 2030. The 
only scenario where we would observe this, if all progress in transforming and 
pluralising the energy systems stalled (similar to the proposed “Leviathan” 
scenario8). Nevertheless, the authors do not argue that RES auctions will disappear 
entirely. Private, municipal, or community tenders for PPAs, are likely to grow 
8 The Leviathan scenario is characterised by low flexibility and low decentralisation of the energy 
system.
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in importance, requiring new and innovative auction designs that minimise 
transactions costs. The lessons learnt through Europe’s roll-out of national scale 
support auctions may be valuable here. Finally, given both the urgency of the 
challenge of tackling climate change and the challenges of coordinating RES 
build-out with supply chain development and grid expansion, a regulatory role 
of some kind exists in all scenarios. Whether it is standardising auctions models 
and contracts or directing geographical density, public policy will continue to 
play a role in the buying and selling of renewable electricity for the near future.
Furthermore, two more reports are currently being drafted in this WP. The first 
one will provide an overview of the use of multi-technology auctions in the EU. 
It will cover descriptive statistics of their outcomes and compare the results to 
their technology-specific counterparts. Furthermore, the report will include 
several short case studies on multi-technology auctions.
The second report will give guidance to policymakers on how to design auctions 
in the changing energy systems of the future. Based on the identified scenarios in 
Woodman and Fitch-Roy (2020), the authors will derive explicit policy 
recommendation on possible auction design considerations.
7. WP8 MODELLING
WP8 aims to facilitate the topical analyses undertaken in other WPs with in-depth 
model-based quantitative assessments. These modelling activities provide further 
insights into interactions between the various WPs. Additionally, modelling plays 
an important role in the case cooperations with the member states in WP2.
In their policy brief, Resch, Geipel and Liebmann (forthcoming) analyse and 
model the need for and impact of RES cooperation across the EU in the 2030 
context, practically done by establishing European and/or Cross-Border RES 
auctions. The findings are based on insights gained from the forward-looking 
model-based analyses where different scenarios for meeting (and exceeding) the 
EU’s overall 2030 RES target have been derived. The 2030 RES ambition has been 
modelled both in accordance with past agreements taken (i.e. National Energy 
and Climate Plan (NECP) ambition to achieve an EU RES share of at least 
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32 %) and under consideration of the needs arising from the European Green 
Deal. The first finding is that, in order to achieve the NECP ambition of at least 
32 % by 2030, only a limited number of MSs requires RES cooperation to meet 
their 2030 planned RES deployment. Summing up, the nationally planned RES 
shares for 2030 lead to an EU RES share of approx. 33.6 %, although strong 
differences in the RES ambition of individual MS can be observed. Modelling 
shows that, without RES cooperation, only an EU RES share of 33.0 % appears 
feasible, since some MSs would fail to achieve their planned RES share using 
only domestic resources. Allowing for RES cooperation would, in turn, assure 
that the planned deployment (33.6 %) can be reached across the whole EU. On 
the other hand, a strong increase of the RES ambition at short notice (by 2030), 
e.g. through the Green Deal, causes a strong demand for RES cooperation across 
the whole EU. Assuming an increase of the 2030 EU RES target to (at least) 
40 %, the modelling activities revealed that without RES cooperation only an 
EU RES share of 37.8 % appears feasible – whereas with RES cooperation the 
planned deployment (40 %) can be reached. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn 
that, under these new framework conditions, EU-wide RES cooperation appears 
essential for achieving a stronger RES uptake at short notice (i.e. by 2030). 
Apart from the above-identified needs for RES cooperation, there are several 
benefits of RES cooperation: Firstly, RES cooperation facilitates a levelling of 
country-specific risk for RES investors. Secondly, a (more) fair effort sharing 
can then be triggered by RES cooperation and, thirdly, it can be expected that 
this decreases the overall cost for reaching ambitious future RES targets, which 
was confirmed by the modelling. More specifically, cross-border RES action can 
reduce support expenditures for new RES installations (i.e. installed post-2020) 
by 23 % to 38 % percentage points compared to the default case where no such 
cooperation was presumed. Furthermore, the authors found out that targeted 
policies offering technology-specific incentives tailored to individual needs, 
done e.g. by use of dedicated RES auctions for feed-in premiums, appear highly 
beneficial for triggering a cost-effective uptake of RES in the electricity sector. 
Cost savings in the range of 28 % to 42 % have been identified when comparing 
average support under targeted RES policy approaches (e.g. RES auctions) with 
umbrella policy approaches (e.g. technology-neutral RES quotas with certificate 
trading). 
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Diallo and Kitzing (2020) examined technology bias between renewable power 
plants in technology-neutral auctions, caused by applying the same auction 
rules for the technologies that have very different characteristics. Four RES 
technologies (PV, onshore wind, offshore wind, and biomass) were evaluated 
using a quantitative model, which was used to determine LCOEs, bid prices, and 
social values of the technologies. Concerning the different design elements, the 
authors were able to formulate rather general and rule of thumb type of policy 
recommendations. The main reason behind this is that the bias is sensitive to 
the initial setup in terms of design elements9. Therefore, a case-by-case analysis 
is required to determine the effect of a design element change on the bias. The 
outcomes show that, while a change of the support period or the introduction 
of grid integration costs and environmental harm compensation may heavily 
influence average bias between technologies, the effects are more moderate when 
changes in granted realisation period or in balancing payment responsibility are 
applied, and almost negligible if changes in the timing of the auction within 
a year occur. Remuneration scheme design is a very important determinant 
as well, but there is no clear hierarchy identifiable which compares two-sided 
sliding premiums and fixed premiums. Both schemes are though clearly 
leading to a lower risk of technology bias than one-sided sliding premiums, 
as in several setups where a technology is mature enough to survive without 
support, one-sided premiums may result in very high biases. An additional very 
important conclusion of the report is that allocative and general efficiency do 
not necessarily occur simultaneously. This is due to the fact that by comparing 
two designs, it is often the case that a given setup results in allocative efficiency, 
but in terms of general efficiency it fares worse than another allocative inefficient 
auction setup.
Furthermore, three more reports are forthcoming in this WP. The first one 
examines by when a possible phase-out of RES support appears feasible for RES 
electricity in general and at technology level. The second one will conduct a 
model-based assessment of economic aspects of RES auctions illustrating the 
impact of improved financing conditions on the support needed to finance 
9 This can result in the fact that the same change in the design (for example increasing support period 
from 15 years to 20), may increase the average bias in one setup and decrease it in another.
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the required RES uptake. Finally, the last forthcoming report will provide all 
technical details of the modelling activities carried out in the AURES II project.
8. CONCLUSION
The first AURES project laid the groundwork for auctions in the renewable 
electricity sector (see Mora et al., 2017). AURES II expands this knowledge by 
analysing the effects of auctions on the RES sector, technological innovation and 
project financing, and by examining the topics of multi-technology and cross-
border auctions, changing electricity systems, as well as community projects in 
detail. It also builds a detailed database of auctions in the EU.
Although the work in WP7 has already shed some light, we believe the next 
step will be to analyse how renewable energy auctions will evolve in the future: 
will we see greater collaboration between member states? Or even EU-wide 
RES auctions? Will auctions expand to other energy-related fields besides the 
electricity sector: allocating support for hydrogen production, (district) heating 
networks, or in the transport sector? Will they be increasingly used by the private 
sector: big multi-national companies using auctions to procure corporate (green) 
PPAs in an efficient and effective manner? Or even smaller energy communities 
that aim to procure green electricity?
Whichever form auctions will take, we believe they will still play a crucial role in 
a future, sustainable energy system.
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